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I. INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (the “Korematsu 
Center”), National Native American Bar Association, National Asian Pacific 
American Bar Association, Native Hawaiian Bar Association, and California 
Indian Law Association, respectfully submit this brief in support of the 
Defendants-Appellees, Blackhorse et al.1 
The Korematsu Center is a nonprofit organization based at Seattle 
University School of Law and works to advance justice through research, 
advocacy, and education.  The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing the 
legacy of Fred Korematsu who defied military orders during World War II that led 
to the internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans, and later became an advocate 
for the civil rights of other victims of excessive government action.  The 
Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring that our courts, laws, and 
government do not become active participants in perpetuating discrimination.  The 
Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views 
of Seattle University. 
The National Native American Bar Association (NNABA) is the oldest and 
largest association of predominantly Native American attorneys in the United 
States.  Founded in 1973 when the first group of Native American attorneys was 
                                           
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief under Rule 29(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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entering the legal profession, NNABA represents the interests of approximately 
2,700 Native American attorneys.  NNABA’s core mission since its inception has 
been to promote the development of Native American attorneys who share the 
communal responsibility of advancing justice for Native Americans.  NNABA 
seeks to ensure that the government does not become a partner in advancing 
harmful racial slurs. 
The National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAPABA) is the 
national association of Asian Pacific American attorneys, judges, law professors, 
and law students.  NAPABA represents the interests of over 50,000 attorneys and 
approximately 75 national, state, and local bar associations.  Its members include 
solo practitioners, large firm lawyers, corporate counsel, legal service and non-
profit attorneys, and lawyers serving at all levels of government.  Since 
NAPABA’s inception in 1988, it has promoted justice, equity, and opportunity for 
Asian Pacific Americans as the national voice for Asian Pacific Americans in the 
legal profession.  These efforts have included civil rights advocacy on various 
fronts.  In furtherance of its mission to promote justice, equity, and opportunity for 
Asian Pacific Americans, NAPABA seeks to ensure that the government does not 
become a partner in advancing harmful racial slurs. 
The Native Hawaiian Bar Association (NHBA) is an association of lawyers, 
judges, and other legal professionals of Hawaiian ancestry that promotes 
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excellence, unity, cooperation, education, and the exchange of ideas among its 
members and in the larger community.  Formed in 1992, NHBA strives for justice 
and effective legal representation for Native Hawaiians.  Their mission is to 
heighten dialogue and interaction between Native Hawaiian legal professionals and 
the larger community.  NHBA seeks to ensure that the government does not 
become a partner in advancing harmful racial slurs. 
The California Indian Law Association (CILA) was formed with the purpose 
of serving as the representative of the Indian law legal profession in California.  
CILA is dedicated to enhancing the legal profession and tribal justice systems in 
California and strives to promote the sound administration of justice to advance the 
status of Indian tribes and American people in the law.  CILA is dedicated to 
helping Indian tribes in California achieve self-determination, self-sufficiency, and 
to protect tribal sovereignty.  CILA seeks to ensure that the government does not 
become a partner in advancing harmful racial slurs. 
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II. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Race still matters in this country.  For many, that is not an easy concept to 
accept, given how far removed we are from the Trail of Tears, slavery, and Jim 
Crow.  And so instead of addressing it, oftentimes we resort to distractions, or fall 
back on academic debates about principles that do not apply but which make it 
easy to ignore this uncomfortable truth.  But the vestiges of racism are all around 
us.  This case is just one example.   
For centuries Native Americans2 have been arguably the most marginalized 
group in the United States.  While the efforts of other racial groups to overcome 
their own marginalization are far from over, in some ways the Native American 
community is still just beginning.  Among major ethnic groups in America, Native 
Americans rank at or near the bottom in income per capita, high school graduation 
rates, and political representation, and suffer from the highest poverty rate and the 
highest unemployment rate.  The child born in America with the lowest probability 
of ever achieving the American dream or self-determination is the Native 
American child.  And unfortunately that statement has been true for a very long 
time.   
                                           
2 Amici use the term Native Americans throughout this brief to refer 
interchangeably and collectively to American Indian, Alaska Native, and Native 
Hawaiian peoples. 
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It is against this historical backdrop of marginalization that a $2.85 billion 
professional sports team has proudly used a racial slur against Native Americans as 
its team name.  The word “redskins” was around long before Pro-Football, Inc. 
(PFI or “the Team”) adopted it as its name, logo, and mascot.  It has always been 
clear that the term has been used to dehumanize a group of human beings living in 
America.  Like calling African Americans “niggers” and Latinos “spics”—words 
that long ago fell out of favor in common lexicon precisely because of their 
negative effects on those groups—Native Americans have suffered the indignity of 
being called “redskins” by those who would diminish their humanity.3  The main 
difference, however, is that Native Americans continue to suffer this indignity in 
the common lexicon.  PFI would never call itself the “Washington Spics,” and then 
have the audacity to argue that it is okay because there is no proof that a 
“substantial composite” of Latinos find that term offensive. 
This case is not about Free Speech, no matter how many colorful non 
sequiturs PFI includes in its brief.  Those arguments are distractions, because 
                                           
3 Amici recognize the odious, abhorrent, and offensive nature of these racist slurs, 
even when they appear in a legal brief that describes their harm and repudiates 
them.  Nevertheless, amici use the slurs themselves, rather than their abbreviations, 
not to be incendiary or exploitative, but to demonstrate a point: as a society, we are 
far more uncomfortable with certain slurs, such as those that discriminate against 
African Americans and Latinos, whereas the slur against Native Americans is 
almost quotidian.  This highlights just how invisible Native Americans are from 
mainstream society, how marginalized they are, and why the government has a 
strong interest in ensuring that it does not facilitate or contribute to their continued 
discrimination, dehumanization, and marginalization.   
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regardless of how this Court rules, PFI can still sell hats, jerseys, helmets, and 
footballs bearing the emblem of a racist anachronism.  PFI has the right to use 
dehumanizing speech, and no one is trying to take away that right. 
But Congress made a policy decision not to register trademarks that 
disparage. The government has a strong interest in ensuring that it is not viewed as 
advancing or promoting racial discrimination in commerce, and it is entitled to 
ensure that its own programs, power, and official symbols—like the federal 
trademark registry—play no part in such discrimination.  The importance of this  
interest is perhaps best evidenced by the policies implemented the U.S. Board of 
Geographic Names.4  Dead Negro Draw, Texas, ostensibly honors black soldiers 
who died during a battle, except that it used to be called Dead Nigger Creek on 
federal maps, until the U.S. Board of Geographic Names intervened.5  Over 30 
place names in America were originally called “Niggerhead” on federal maps, but 
most of those names were changed to swap out “Nigger” for Negro, such as Negro 
Ben Peak, Arizona—“named after a miner known as ‘Nigger Ben McClendon.’”6  
As late as 1974, there were 200 place names on federal maps that still referenced 
                                           
4 As discussed below, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is another strong 
example of the government disavowing harmful racial discrimination in 
commerce. 
5 Jennings Brown & Tal Reznik, Racial Slurs Are Woven Deep Into The American 
Landscape, VOCATIV, Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.vocativ.com/news/244179/racial-
slurs-are-woven-deep-into-the-american-landscape/. 
6 Id. 
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“Japs,” and even today there are 30 places on federal maps named “Chinaman.”7  
And until last year, a lake and creek in Washington were called Coon Lake and 
Coon Creek, respectively, on federal maps.  This example shows that when the 
government creates programs like the federal trademark registry or publishes maps, 
it may decline to allow others to use them in a manner that contributes to 
discrimination.   
The government’s decision to not subsidize racial discrimination does not 
implicate the First Amendment because PFI can still express whatever message it 
wants.  But to the extent the decision to cancel PFI’s trademark registrations 
implicates First Amendment principles, that decision should survive PFI’s facial 
challenge against Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act given the government’s 
important interests in not facilitating the debilitating effects of racism. 
Affirming the decision below would not be a vote to silence speech or carve 
apart the First Amendment.  It would be an acknowledgement that race still matters 
in America, and that when it comes to Native Americans, the government ought to 
start doing something about their marginalization.  The government’s decision to 
cancel PFI’s trademark registrations is one place to start. 
                                           
7 Id. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. “Redskins” Is a Disparaging Racial Slur, Akin to “Nigger” or “Spic.”  
That Matters Because the Impacts of Such Blatant Racial 
Discrimination Are Real and Significant.  The Government Can Decline 
to Promote, Endorse, Facilitate or Associate Itself With Such 
Discrimination, Particularly Through the Use of One of Its Own 
Programs. 
1. “Redskins” is as bad as “spic” or “nigger.” 
Buried at the very end of PFI’s brief, behind a litany of dystopian (but 
irrelevant) First Amendment analogies, is its most remarkable argument of all: the 
notion that the term “redskins” is not disparaging at all.  This argument is not 
credible. 
First, “redskins” was historically used as a reference to Native Americans 
during a time when cash bounties were paid for their scalps.8  In the same way that 
other slurs are used to express animus towards marginalized groups, “redskins” 
conveys animus and hatred toward Native Americans.  It is to Native Americans 
                                           
8 See Value Of An Indian Scalp: Minnesota Paid Its Pioneers a Bounty for Every 
Redskin Killed, LOS ANGELES HERALD 26 (Oct. 24, 1897) (“[T[he state treasury 
once paid out cash as counties for Sioux Indian scalps, just as [it would pay] for 
wolf scalps.”); see also Note, A Public Accommodations Challenge to the Use of 
Indian Team Names and Mascots in Professional Sports, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 
912 n.64 (1999) (quoting Letter from Lawrence R. Baca, Chairman, Indian Law 
Section of the Federal Bar Association, to John Hope Franklin, Chairman, 
President’s Advisory Board on Race Relations 2 (June 30, 1997) (on file with 
Harvard Law Library)) (HEREINAFTER “Indian Team Names”). 
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what “nigger” is to African Americans.9  That is the sine qua non of 
disparagement. 
Second, it is unlikely that when the Team adopted the name “redskins” in 
1932 that it was doing so as an homage to Native Americans.  In fact, the next year 
the Team’s owner, “George Preston Marshall instituted what would become a 13-
year league-wide ban on African-American players from the NFL.”10  It took 30 
years—until 1962—for the Team to integrate and finally accept its first African 
American players, the last NFL team to do so.11   
Ironically, the reason the Team desegregated and began signing non-white 
players was because “[t]he Redskins were preparing to move into a new stadium 
being built on federally controlled land affiliated with the national parks system,” 
and the government stipulated that the Team had to integrate to use the new 
stadium.12  As the Team integrated in 1962, the Team’s owner lamented that “the 
                                           
9 See Gyasi Ross, “Redskins”: A Native’s Guide to Debating an Inglorious Word, 
DEADSPIN, Oct. 16, 2013, http://deadspin.com/redskins-a-natives-guide-to-
debating-an-inglorious-1445909360; Indian Team Names at 912 n.65 (quoting 
Lawrence R. Baca, What About the Indian Country “N” Word? 2 (Nov. 17, 1998) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library)). 
10 Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Ending the Legacy of Racism in Sports & the Era of 
Harmful “Indian” Sports Mascots, NCAI 2 (Oct. 2013), http://www.ncai.org/ 
resources/ncai-publications/Ending_the_Legacy_of_Racism.pdf.   
11 See Ryan Basen, Fifty Years Ago, Last Outpost of Segregation in N.F.L. Fell, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/sports/football/50-
years-ago-redskins-were-last-nfl-team-to-integrate.html. 
12 Id.   
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government had the right to tell a showman how to cast the play.”13  Five years 
later, the Team filed for the first of its Redskins federal trademarks. 
Third, when applied to the real world, PFI likely does not believe its own 
argument (which should raise questions about the rest of its case theory).  For 
instance, amici encourage the panel to ask PFI whether it would tolerate if one of 
its human resources managers described a Native American candidate for 
employment as a “redskin.”  (E.g., “A redskin applied for the opening in 
accounting.”)  Or if a PFI owner would condone her daughter referring to her 
Native Americans classmates or teachers as “redskins.” 
The bottom line is this: PFI is likely to admit that it would never be 
appropriate to look a Native American in the eye and call her a “redskin,” just like 
it would never be appropriate to call a Latino a “spic” or an African-American 
person a “nigger.”14  Because it’s racist.  These racist connotations do not go away 
the second one associates the term with a football team.  Calling their team the 
“Washington Spics” or the “Washington Niggers” would not transform those terms 
                                           
13 Id.   
14 Cf. Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Perhaps no 
single act can more quickly ‘alter the conditions of employment and create an 
abusive working environment’ . . . than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet 
such as ‘nigger’ by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.” (citations 
omitted)); Baily v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“The use of the 
word ‘nigger’ automatically separates the person addressed from every non-black 
person; this is discrimination per se.”). 
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into honorifics.  When applied outside the context of their legal brief, PFI’s 
suggestion that its use of “redskins” is not disparaging simply falls apart. 
2. Given the pernicious effects of racism, Congress can validly make 
the policy decision not to endorse, promote, or facilitate racist 
trademarks through its own program. 
PFI belittles the impacts of racism, likening its team name to pornographic 
trademarks, and suggesting that if these other marks are appropriate, then surely its 
mark passes muster.  This is a facile argument.   
i.  The deleterious effects of racism on a person’s dignity have been 
undisputed for the past half-century.  For instance, laws banning discrimination in 
public accommodations, such as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
II”)15 and state laws like Washington state’s Law Against Discrimination,16 were 
enacted  “‘to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies 
denials of equal access to public establishments.’”17  They were enacted to ensure 
that government’s power to regulate commerce was used to combat racial 
discrimination—rather than promote it.     
                                           
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 
16 Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60. 
17 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (quoting 
S. Rep. No. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2370); 
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010 (the WLAD recognizes that race and sexual 
orientation discrimination “threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its 
inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic 
state”). 
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Indeed, the legislative history accompanying Title II reveals that Congress’s 
primary intent was, in fact, to address racism’s deleterious effects on a person’s 
dignity.18  And in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
described the devastating toll racism in public accommodations inflicts on 
children: 
[Y]ou suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech 
stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year old 
daughter why she cannot go to the public amusement 
park that has just been advertised on television, and see 
tears welling up in her little eyes when she is told that 
Funtown is closed to colored children, and see the 
depressing clouds of inferiority begin to form in her little 
mental sky . . . .19 
Back in the 1960s, in a not-so-distant echo of the arguments PFI raises here, 
proponents of racial discrimination challenged state and federal laws banning 
discrimination in public accommodations under the First Amendment, asserting 
they violated constitutional guarantees of free association and free exercise.  But 
none of those challenges succeeded. 
ii.  The federal government’s policies about how to name geographic 
locations provides a strong analogy to this case.  Nigger Lake, New York; Wetback 
Tank Reserve, New Mexico; Chink’s Peak, Idaho; Squaw Tit, Nevada.  Those are 
                                           
18 S. Rep. No. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 
2370. 
19 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail 6-7 (Apr. 16, 1963), 
reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 76 (1964).   
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just a few of the thousands of place names in the United States that had racially 
derogatory names.  The elders in amici’s respective organizations are all too 
familiar with living their daily lives in the shadows of these racist place names. 
The shadows cast by these names were made darker because these racist place 
names were “approved” by the federal government and appeared on federal maps. 
In order to distance itself from promoting or approving racism, the 
government has adopted a mechanism by which the United States Board of 
Geographic Names (the Board) can change the name as it is reported on federal 
maps after a name change proposal is received—particularly where the existing 
name is based on a racist slur.20   This mechanism ensures that neither the 
government nor its official signage and maps are associated with racial 
discrimination.   
In fact, in the 1960s the Board began altering place names that contained 
racial slurs such as “Nigger” or “Jap.”21  And for decades the Board’s guidelines 
have specifically prohibited the word “Jap” or “Nigger,” “whether or not it is 
                                           
20 See Donald J. Orth & Roger L. Payne, Principles, Policies, and Procedures: 
Domestic Geographic Names, U.S. BOARD ON GEOGRAPHIC NAMES 21-22 (1997), 
http://geonames.usgs.gov/docs/pro_pol_pro.pdf (HEREINAFTER “Domestic 
Geographic Names”); see also 43 U.S.C. § 364. 
21 See Michael Muskal, In Washington and Oregon, offensive names of places are 
quietly taken off the maps, L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 2015, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-racist-maps-20151116-story.html. 
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current local usage and regardless of by whom proposed.”22  Of course, locals 
remain free to call places whatever they want.  But the federal government will not 
participate in furthering these private practices or be viewed as promoting racial 
discrimination by publishing racist names on federal maps and signage. 
Like the authority vested in the Board to refuse to publish racist names on 
federal maps, the Patent and Trademark Office has authority to refuse to register 
and to rescind registrations of racially derogatory trademarks.  And like the locals 
who remain free to call their place names whatever they want, PFI is free to use its 
racially derogatory name and trademarks.  The federal government, however, may 
refuse to enable, promote, or associate itself with these usages through its own 
programs, as it does with racist place names. 
iii.  The government’s decision to decline to register racist slurs makes sense 
for all the same reasons that the government regulates discrimination in public 
accommodations and geographic place names—because the harms of 
disparagement are real.  “Indian team names and mascots in particular have been 
charged with fostering ‘racial stereotyping,’ causing low self-esteem amongst 
American Indians, and setting up Indian children as targets for physical harassment 
by their peers.”23  And that’s not all: 
                                           
22 Domestic Geographic Names at 22. 
23 Indian Team Names, supra note 8, at 911 (footnotes omitted). 
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The studies suggest that American Indian mascots have 
harmful psychological consequences for the group that is 
caricaturized by mascots.  This is true whether . . . the 
mascot represented an American Indian university, a 
mainstream university, or a professional sports team.  
. . . .  
American Indian mascots thus remind American Indians 
of the limited ways in which others see them.  Moreover, 
because identity construction is not solely an individual 
process (i.e., you cannot be a self by yourself), the views 
of American Indians held by others can also limit the 
ways in which American Indians see themselves.24 
The bombardment of slurs has a lasting negative effect on Native 
Americans, not only “threaten[ing] the psychological functioning of American 
Indians” but also “facilitating the expression of discriminatory and explicitly racist 
attitudes toward American Indians” by non-Native people.25  As Professor 
Steinfeldt explained to Congress: 
Having a cultural icon like Chris Berman provide 
colorful commentary on Washington’s pro football team 
doesn’t mean that such a hateful racial [epithet] (i.e., 
Redskin) doesn’t hurt people—rather, it means that the 
people using this hateful term have become desensitized 
to the fact that they are hurting people with their 
historical tradition of dishonor.  Despite how members of 
mainstream society want to frame the issue, this is NOT 
                                           
24 Stephanie A. Fryberg, et al., Of Warrior Chiefs and Indian Princesses: The 
Psychological Consequences of American Indian Mascots, 30 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 208, 216 (2008).  
25 Stolen Identities: The Impact of Racist Stereotypes on Indigenous People: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indians Affairs 112 Cong. 69 (2011) (prepared 
statement of Jesse A. Steinfeldt, Assistant Professor, Indiana University-
Bloomington). 
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an issue of mere sensitivity, offensiveness, or “political 
correctness.”  Rather this is an issue involving 
oppression, stereotyping, and inflicting psychological 
harm[.]26 
Indeed, the human costs of racism that Dr. King described are not limited to 
those contexts where an accommodation is denied.  If a hotel clerk begrudgingly 
accepts African-American and Native American patrons, but calls each one a 
“nigger” and a “redskin,” those harms are not cut off at the front desk; a father is 
still left with the unenviable task of explaining to his daughter, “tongue twisted and 
[his] speech stammering,” why those terms are still accepted as normal parlance in 
2016.27  Likewise, if hotels (and sports teams) admit minorities, but use names like 
“Redskins Inn,” “Nigger Inn,” or “Spic Inn”—and even get such names federally-
registered as trademarks—the impact is similar to a denial of public 
accommodations. 
“When the symbol for a federally registered trademark, ®, is affixed to a 
mark, it is a declaration by the federal government that it has approved that mark.”  
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 461 (E.D. Va. 2015).  PFI 
tries to downplay the significance of this federal approval.  At the same time, 
                                           
26 Id. 
27 See Jones v. City of Boston, 738 F. Supp. 604, 605 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting that 
calling patron a “nigger” at a bar—despite serving him—still satisfies the Title II 
requirement “of showing that he was denied equal access to a place of public 
accommodation on the basis of race” because “[t]he term ‘nigger’ is intimidating 
by its very nature”). 
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however, PFI asserts that cancelling its registration based on the notion that 
“‘Redskins’ disparages Native Americans tarnishes the Team’s name,” which is an 
acknowledgement that federal approval helps inoculate PFI against charges of 
racism.  See Opening Br. of App. at 44.  Explicit federal approval of a racist mark 
is not a right under any cognizable First Amendment theory.  But that’s the world 
PFI wants to create: a world where “Spic Beans” could get a federal trademark, 
“Nigger Head Ice Cream” could get a federal trademark, and the “Washington 
Redskins” could maintain their federal trademark. 
And so, the Native American father must still explain to his daughter why it 
remains acceptable for others to think nothing of calling their people “redskins” on 
SportsCenter, and why the federal government has approved and endorsed the use 
of its ® next to a slur and done nothing to distance itself from such racial 
discrimination. 
B. The Government’s Decision to Cancel PFI’s Racist Trademark Does 
Not Violate the First Amendment. 
1. Cancelling PFI’s trademark does not restrict any speech or 
expression.   
No matter how the Court rules in this case, PFI can continue calling its team 
whatever it wants, and continue selling hats, jerseys, helmets, and footballs 
inscribed with its racist moniker.  Because cancelling PFI’s trademark registrations 
“do[es] not burden, restrict, or prohibit PFI’s ability to use the marks,” PFI remains 
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free to continue making money off the commercialization of a dehumanizing 
slur.28  But given the severe, tangible, and lasting impacts of racism, the 
government can refuse to endorse or facilitate PFI’s intolerance by registering 
PFI’s trademarks.29  The government can also refuse to subsidize or facilitate PFI’s 
ability to maximize profit from its racist mark as a valid exercise of its ability to set 
limitations on its own programs.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) 
(finding that government may set limits on Title X spending program); Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (rejecting 
argument that government must subsidize First Amendment rights). 
PFI does not credibly argue that the government must accept every proposed 
trademark, so long as it is unique.  As with all its programs, the government has 
some discretion, and that discretion must be exercised reasonably.  Here, given the 
racist underpinnings of PFI’s marks and the impacts of racism (both explained in 
Section III.A. above), the government exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 
2(a), in a reasonable fashion.  That decision is consistent with the government’s 
                                           
28 Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. at 455; accord Specialized Seating, Inc. v. 
Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that cancellation 
of registration “does not affect the mark’s validity, because a trademark need not 
be registered to be enforceable”); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 
814 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he cancellation of a trademark registration 
does not extinguish common law rights that registration did not create.”). 
29 Cf. Ysura v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n., 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009) (noting difference 
between “abridging” and “declining to promote” free speech). 
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other anti-discrimination policies with respect to racism, such as ensuring equal 
access to public accommodations. 
Cancelling’s PFI’s registrations does not restrict speech.  Unlike denial of a 
parade license, which affirmatively prevents expression, PFI cannot identify a 
single act of speech that it would be unable to express if the decision below were 
affirmed.  PFI’s reliance on Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), is 
misplaced.  There, the Court invalidated a Vermont law that “forb[ade],” 
“bar[red],” “prohibit[ed],” and “prevent[ed]” pharmacies from selling certain 
marketing information and pharmaceutical sales companies from using this 
information in their marketing activities.  See id. at 2663.  It is axiomatic that a law 
that prohibits or prevents parties from saying certain things qualifies as a “specific, 
content-based burden on protected expression” because it involves direct obstacles 
and restrictions placed by the government in the path of “speech.”  See id. at 2664.  
That is not the issue here, because even if the Court affirms, PFI could still use the 
same name, logo, and mascot.   
PFI has not identified any First Amendment principle that entitles it to 
government assistance in enforcing its trademarks.  Simply because the 
government is not helping PFI express itself, does not mean that PFI is unable or 
somehow obstructed from expressing its ideas—no matter how odious they may 
be.  Nevertheless, PFI likens the cancellation of its trademarks to the government 
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“turn[ing] the lights off at a Redskins night game . . . and defend[ing] the action 
because the Redskins can still play in the dark.”  Opening Br. of App. at 5.  That is 
an inapt analogy.  Cancelling its registration does not block PFI from using the 
Redskins name, selling memorabilia featuring that slur, or drafting and signing 
players to compete on their team.  PFI even admits that losing its registration does 
not prevent it from going after those PFI believes is infringing on its mark.  No 
one’s turned off the lights. 
Cancellation simply means the government will not affirmatively allow its 
own program to be used to endorse, promote, or subsidize PFI’s ability to 
capitalize of its mark, or help PFI stop those who might use the mark in a different 
way.  See Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (“We again reject the notion that First 
Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by 
the State.” (citation and quotations omitted)); Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359 (“[T]he 
State’s decision not to [provide deductions for union dues] is not an abridgment of 
the unions’ speech; they are still free to engage in such speech as they see fit.  
They simply are barred from enlisting the State in support of that endeavor.”); 
Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 366 (1988) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to law 
barring certain workers who are on strike from receiving food stamps). 
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PFI’s insistence that the government help PFI defend its marks is where 
PFI’s First Amendment argument capsizes.  PFI is not looking to protect speech; it 
wants to curtail speech by having a federally-recognized trademark it can use to 
silence its critics.  PFI is afraid of the inevitable counter-speech that it predicts will 
“infringe or dilute the communicative value of [its] marks.”  Opening Br. of App. 
at 11.  Admittedly, in the wake of the cancellation, other speakers may be 
emboldened to challenge PFI’s marks in the marketplace of ideas by caricaturing 
it, or by trying to re-appropriate “redskins” for the Native American community.  
Regardless of the nature or scope of this counter-speech, it will be up to PFI to 
defend its marks, and PFI admits that post-cancellation it will still have the legal 
means of doing so.  Opening Br. of App. at 19.  If PFI’s mark is truly distinctive 
then the common law will still protect it from infringement; and if PFI’s mark truly 
reflects non-discriminatory messages, then PFI has little to fear from potential 
counter-speakers trying to “dilute” its message.  But the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause does not, ipso facto, entitle PFI to government protection against 
the speech that others might engage in that may (or may not) dilute its trademark. 
2. Section 2(a) does not implicate the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions. 
A federally recognized trademark is a public benefit, and the government 
may not condition the receipt of that benefit on a condition that “effectively 
prohibit[s] the recipient from engaging in [constitutionally] protected conduct 
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outside the scope of the federally funded program.”  Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 
(emphasis added).  PFI asserts that the government’s decision to cancel its 
trademark imposes an unconstitutional condition on protected speech.  Opening Br. 
of App. at 31-32.  But the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not apply 
here because PFI’s speech “outside the scope of the federally funded program” is 
not restricted in any way. 
The distinction between imposing conditions on a government program and 
on a recipient of that program’s benefits is critical.  For instance, in Rust the Court 
explained how Congress’s decision to prohibit federal funds from being used on 
abortions as a condition for receiving Title X funds was not an unconstitutional 
condition because recipients of Title X funds could still perform abortions, using 
non-federal funds, and still be eligible for the program.  500 U.S. at 196.  By 
contrast, had Congress stated that no recipient of federal funds under Title X could 
perform abortions no matter what—even outside the context of that recipient’s use 
of Title X funds—that would have been an unconstitutional condition targeted at 
the recipient’s rights to engage in constitutional conduct outside the scope of Title 
X, rather than a discretionary limit on a federal program. 
Likewise, in Lyng, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Food Stamp 
Act, even though that legislation stated “that no household shall become eligible to 
participate in the food stamp program” if a member of the household is on strike.  
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485 U.S. at 362.  The Court acknowledged that although “[d]enying such benefits 
makes it harder for strikers to maintain themselves” and even “exerts pressure on 
them” to stop striking, “the strikers’ right of association does not require the 
Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that right.”  Id. at 368; 
see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) 
(rejecting First Amendment challenge to law requiring Rotary Clubs to admit 
women because the law “does not require the clubs to abandon or alter” any of 
their activities or their basic goals).  
Like Title X and the Food Stamp Act, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is a 
reasonable limitation on a federal program (trademark registration), rather than an 
unconstitutional condition on recipients of that program.  There is no extraneous 
consequence to a registrant who uses a trademark that the federal government 
refuses to register.  Whether or not the government cancels PFI’s federal 
trademarks, the Team can continue to call itself the Redskins, and still register any 
other trademarks it wishes (so long as those trademarks independently qualify).  In 
fact, PFI could still use the Lanham Act’s other provisions to enforce its 
trademarks.30   
Put differently, engaging in speech that the government refuses to register as 
trademarks does not disqualify PFI from using the Lanham Act to register and 
                                           
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
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enforce trademarks.  It is simply a narrow limitation on PFI’s ability to force the 
government to publish this one mark in the federal register. 
3. Section 2(a) does not chill speech. 
PFI’s assertion that Section 2(a) chills speech also has no merit.  An indirect 
burden on speech can chill speech enough to trigger heightened scrutiny.  See 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Ins., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011).  In Sorrell, the Court 
found that because Vermont barred pharmaceutical manufacturers and detailers 
from buying, selling, using, or in any way disclosing valuable marketing 
information to physicians, this had the effect of chilling First Amendment exercise 
because it essentially took certain words right out of the speakers’ mouths.  Id. at 
2663.  (“Vermont’s law thus has the effect of preventing detailers . . . from 
communicating with physicians in an effective and informative manner.”).  That is 
a far cry from this case. 
Unlike the regulation at issue in Sorrell, Section 2(a) has not erected any 
barriers in PFI’s path to express whatever message it wishes to express.  Sorrell 
would apply if cancellation meant that PFI could no longer use its trademark.  But 
unlike Sorrell,  PFI is in the same First Amendment position it was in before the 
Lanham Act was enacted.  The notion that the government chills speech every time 
it declines to endorse or subsidize speech is foreign to First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
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4. Section 2(a) is viewpoint neutral. 
According to PFI, Section 2(a) is viewpoint-based discrimination, and 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny, “because it regulates speech based on a 
‘particular point of view.’” Opening Br. of App. at 14 (quoting FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984)).  Setting aside PFI’s flawed 
premise that Section 2(a) regulates speech (it does not regulate, much less restrict, 
any messages), as written and as applied, Section 2(a) is viewpoint neutral. 
Viewpoint-based discrimination occurs when laws target “the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”  Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).  But here, Section 2(a) 
prevents the registration of any trademark—regardless of the viewpoint—that 
“disparage[s] . . . persons, living or dead.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  For example, a 
Native American organization trying to re-appropriate the term redskins—i.e., the 
opposite side of PFI in this debate—would similarly be barred from registering a 
trademark bearing this term.  In fact, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(TTAB) denied registration to a band comprised of Asian musicians trying to re-
appropriate the term “slants,” a racial slur against Asians.  In re Tam, 108 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, 2103 WL 5498164, at*5-*8 (T.T.A.B. 2013), aff’d, 785 F.3d 567 
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(Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded by, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).31  
Likewise, the TTAB denied registration to a Jewish magazine seeking to register 
“Heeb,” an anti-Semitic slur.  In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 
(T.T.A.B. 2008).  General proscriptions against disparaging speech do not “‘give 
one group an advantage over another in the marketplace of ideas,’” and are 
therefore viewpoint neutral.  Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. 
Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 582 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 793 (2016) 
(citation omitted). 
5. Even if Section 2(a) implicates free speech—and it does not—it is 
a valid regulation of commercial speech. 
The only conceivable speech at issue here is commercial speech.32  The 
Court has loosely defined commercial speech as the “dissemination of information 
as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what 
price.”  Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 765 (1976).  As designations used to “identify and distinguish” a person’s 
goods, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “trademark”), trademarks fall within the 
                                           
31 The federal circuit reversed the TTAB in Tam, concluding that Section 2(a) was 
viewpoint discriminatory.  Amici respectfully disagree with that decision. 
32 Even if, however, the Court were to find that trademarks are not commercial 
speech—and instead applies strict scrutiny to Section 2(a)—amici would argue that 
the government’s interest in avoiding the harms caused by disparaging trademarks 
is so compelling that Section 2(a) would survive strict scrutiny.  Thus, though the 
arguments below are tailored to commercial speech, they apply equally to a strict 
scrutiny analysis. 
Appeal: 15-1874      Doc: 61            Filed: 02/11/2016      Pg: 35 of 44
  -27-  
 
LEGAL129846957.2  
commercial speech rubric.  See Dastar Corp. v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 539 
U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (calling trademarks “source-identifying mark[s]”). 
Because commercial speech holds a “subordinate position in the scale of 
First Amendment values,” it enjoys less First Amendment protection.  Fla. Bar v. 
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).  Consequently, regulations of truthful, 
non-deceptive commercial speech are permissible if: (i) “the asserted government 
interest [behind the regulation] is substantial,” (ii) “the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted,” and (iii) “[the regulation] is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  Even if this 
Court applies the Central Hudson framework, Section 2(a) survives scrutiny. 
i. First, as outlined above, given our nation’s unfortunate history of 
mistreatment of racial minorities, particularly Native Americans, legislatures on 
the state and federal level repeatedly have concluded that combatting the degrading 
impacts of racism is a compelling state interest.33  That is the underlying purpose 
                                           
33 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (recognizing that 
“help[ing] to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups that have 
historically been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group 
members to live in peace where they wish” is a compelling state interest); Regents 
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“In 
light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives 
of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a 
state interest of the highest order.”); Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 277 
(4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough a state government might practice racial 
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of Title II of the Civil Rights Act, and the constellation of state analogues of that 
federal legislation. 
Like Title II, the Lanham Act’s objective is two-fold: first, to protect 
trademark holders; second, and more importantly, to protect, promote, and advance 
full participation in commerce by all consumers.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  
Consistent with these objectives, the Lanham Act prohibits registration of 
trademarks that do not further these government interests and goals.  Thus, in 
addition to prohibiting registration of marks which may disparage institutions or 
groups, Section 2(a) also prohibits registration of marks that are likely to cause 
confusion among consumers, implicate their privacy interests, or are otherwise 
misleading or deceptive—all things likely to harm consumers or impact their 
ability and desire to participate fully in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
Just like marks that confuse or mislead consumers, or marks that invade 
consumer privacy, marks that disparage individual or group identities have the 
effect of decreasing full consumer participation in commerce while also sending 
the message that the government is a participant in endorsing, advancing, and 
promoting that behavior.  Section 2(a) alleviates these harms and directly advances 
the government’s interests in distancing itself from racial discrimination thereby 
                                                                                                                                        
discrimination for decades—and many have—we would not therefore be barred 
from considering racial equality a state interest of the highest order.” (citing Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 396)). 
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discouraging the perpetuation of racial discrimination in commerce and 
encouraging full participation by all consumers in commerce. 
ii.  Denying registration directly advances the government’s interest in not 
facilitating racial discrimination.  As PFI itself acknowledges, the government’s 
“approval” in the form of a federal trademark helps its brand; because that brand 
disparages Native Americans, a historically marginalized group, the government 
has a substantial interest not to help PFI express hateful messages.34  A number of 
commercial speech cases have recognized substantial interests that are unavoidably 
entangled with government disapproval of a certain message.35 
Disparaging speech may have some value in certain First Amendment 
contexts, but the commercial speech context is not one of them.  “Resort to 
epithets . . . is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion 
safeguarded by the Constitution.”  Cantwell v. State of Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 309-
310 (1940).  No First Amendment value is served by allowing PFI to use the 
federal registration system to more easily profit from labeling its brand, football 
team, cheerleaders, mascot, and apparel with a racist slur.  In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 
1367 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
                                           
34 See Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 1981) 
(noting that “racial harmony and equality is a substantial state interest”). 
35 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 
U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (discouraging gambling); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 
436 U.S. 447, 466-67 (1978) (regulating in-person attorney solicitation). 
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Invalidating Section 2(a) would further have the incongruous effect of 
providing more protection to corporate entities when others misappropriate their 
marks while leaving marginalized groups like Native Americans unprotected while 
their identities are disparaged, denigrated, and exploited by others for profit.  And 
while Section 2(a) does not, on its face, seek to “protect underrepresented groups 
in our society from being bombarded with demeaning messages,” doing so serves 
the Lanham Act’s broader goal of facilitating interstate commerce.36  Decisions 
upholding public accommodation laws lend analogous support for this proposition 
because in the same way discriminatory conduct has the power to exclude others 
from market participation, so does disparaging speech.37 
iii.  Section 2(a) is also appropriately tailored.  The First Amendment does 
not require that the fit between a commercial speech regulation and a substantial 
interest be “perfect” or “the least restrictive means.”  Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of 
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).   
Section 2(a) is appropriately tailored because it does not impose a ban on 
using disparaging trademarks and it has nothing to do with creation of ownership 
                                           
36 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1364 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
accord 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
37 E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1964) (finding 
discriminatory practices depressed spending in interstate commerce by African 
Americans); Jones v. City of Boston, 738 F. Supp. 604, 605 (D. Mass. 1990) 
(holding that use of a racial epithet shows an intent to discriminate on the basis of 
race and is sufficient to violate state public accommodations law). 
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“rights” in those marks (as those arise through use).  And the Lanham Act’s 
statutory cancellation procedure places the burden on disparaged parties to bring 
challenges to cancel a mark.  15 U.S.C. § 1064.  This helps ensure that registration 
will be cancelled only in those instances where marks are shown to be disparaging.   
PFI and its amici suggest that Section 2(a) is not narrowly tailored because it 
is underinclusive.  To make this point, PFI employs a crass but ultimately 
meaningless device: it highlights dozens of examples it describes as “misogynistic, 
vulgar, or otherwise offensive” marks registered by the Patent and Trademark 
Office.  See Opening Br. of App. at 4, 24, 39-40.  But likening racial slurs to “JIZZ 
underwear” and “ANAL FANTASY COLLECTION” is precisely the sort of distracting 
debasement that has allowed racial discrimination to continue in the first place.  Id. 
at 4, 24.  Moreover, PFI’s analogies are beside the point: failing to capture all 
offensive marks does not render Section 2(a)’s disparagement provision 
underinclusive; rather it shows that the registration prohibition is aimed squarely at 
disparaging marks and does not affect any more speech than necessary.  See 
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1661 (2015) (concluding because 
perfect tailoring is “impossibl[e]” that “the First Amendment does not confine a 
State to addressing evils in their most acute forms”). 
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In sum, even if the Court concludes that Section 2(a) implicates the First 
Amendment, its restrictions impact no more and no less commercial speech than 
necessary to achieve the government’s goals. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Racism is not a buzzword.  It is real.  And its impacts are far reaching, 
pernicious, and profound.  That’s the real issue in this case, and far more important 
than the colorful, but ultimately irrelevant academic debate PFI hopes the Court 
focuses on.  Amici respectfully request that the Court affirm the decision below. 
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